Research
Peer-Reviewed Publications
Should We Stay or Should We Go? Exploring the Outcomes of Great Power Retrenchment (with Douglas B. Atkinson). 2016. Research and Politics 3(4).
Within foreign policy and academic circles in the United States and other western countries, retrenchment has become an increasingly controversial topic. In spite of the increased attention, there have been few empirical studies that rigorously examine the outcomes of great power retrenchment. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by performing a quantitative analysis of great power retrenchment outcomes from 1870–2007. Counter to the retrenchment pessimists’ expectations, we find that retrenchment leads to relatively positive outcomes for declining states. States that choose to retrench experience shorter periods of economic decline and are less likely to be the target of predatory conflict initiation.
Article | Appendix | Replication Data (Dataverse)
Within foreign policy and academic circles in the United States and other western countries, retrenchment has become an increasingly controversial topic. In spite of the increased attention, there have been few empirical studies that rigorously examine the outcomes of great power retrenchment. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by performing a quantitative analysis of great power retrenchment outcomes from 1870–2007. Counter to the retrenchment pessimists’ expectations, we find that retrenchment leads to relatively positive outcomes for declining states. States that choose to retrench experience shorter periods of economic decline and are less likely to be the target of predatory conflict initiation.
Article | Appendix | Replication Data (Dataverse)
Working Papers
Drought and the Militarization of International River Disputes
How does the onset of drought influence the management of international river disputes? Previous research has found that states with arid climates are more likely to use force over river disputes. However, scholars have yet to examine the effect of below-average precipitation effect the use of force. I argue that short-term dry spells, or droughts, represent acute crises that may substantially disrupt states' ability to use river water. In doing so, they may enhance the willingness of states with international disputes over the proper use of river water to use force to coerce their opponents into complying with their demands. I test this argument using data on river claims from the Issue Correlates of War project. I find that countries experiencing below average rainfall in a given year are more likely to use force over a river claim. I also find that this effect is stronger for states that have arid climates. In addition, the probability of conflict decreases the longer a state remains in a period of drought, suggesting that states adapt to new levels of water availability over time.
Estimating a Split-Population Cox Model using Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression
Standard duration models assume that all individuals in the sample will eventually fail, regardless of whether they are censored. This is often an unjustified assumption that can produce biased coefficient estimates. Split-population models correct this problem by estimating the probability that a unit fails at all, then estimating the hazard rate conditional on the probability of failure. Although parametric split-population models have seen limited applications in political science, I demonstrate that a split-population Cox model can be estimated using a zero-inflated Poisson model based on a convenient equivalence between Cox and Poisson regression. I illustrate the usefulness of the model using a replication analysis of data on international cease-fires.
POLMETH Poster
Lost but not Forgotten: Loss Aversion, Diversionary Conflict, and the Militarization of Territorial Disputes
Diversionary theory posits that international leaders are more likely to engage in the use of military force against other states in times when their tenure in office is imperiled. Recent research on the diversionary use of force has coalesced around the notion that leaders are more likely to divert over certain issues than others. Those issues that are highly salient to the public, such as territory or human rights, are more likely to elicit a positive boost in public opinion for leaders whose status is threatened. Drawing on research on loss aversion, I argue that domestic audiences are more likely to respond favorably to disputes to recover losses of some valuable good rather than promote gains. I test this argument in the context of international territorial disputes using two different indicators of economic performance and find that leaders are far more likely to engage in diversionary military activities against states which have seized land from them than those that have not.
Fight or Flight: Inter-Rival Bargaining, Attrition, and Militarized Threats (with Douglas B. Atkinson and Joshua Jackson)
What explains variations in the level of hostility between rivals? Although most international conflicts occur within the context of rivalry, the level of hostility and conflict within a rivalry varies considerably over time. We explore this issue as it relates to the issuance of militarized threats. We conceptualize rivalry as a game of attrition, wherein rivals compete to obtain a good by imposing costs on each other in a bidding process resembling an auction. Competing rivals attempt to impose costs on each other to force the other state to back down, allowing the winning state to obtain the good at a cheaper cost than they would otherwise. This process continues until the cost of continuing the rivalry for one state exceeds the cost of capitulating and it gives in. As part of this process, rivals attempt to signal their resolve by sending costly signals of their willingness and ability to endure the costs of continuing the dispute. Militarized threats represent one potential signaling mechanism allowing states to issue threats while bearing costs (i.e. the risk of war). Based on this argument, we expect the frequency of militarized threats to be highest during periods of uncertainty about each rival’s resolve, e.g. when the rivalry is new or when there are rapid changes in the distribution of relative power between rivals. We test our argument using the Militarized Compellent Threat dataset.
How does the onset of drought influence the management of international river disputes? Previous research has found that states with arid climates are more likely to use force over river disputes. However, scholars have yet to examine the effect of below-average precipitation effect the use of force. I argue that short-term dry spells, or droughts, represent acute crises that may substantially disrupt states' ability to use river water. In doing so, they may enhance the willingness of states with international disputes over the proper use of river water to use force to coerce their opponents into complying with their demands. I test this argument using data on river claims from the Issue Correlates of War project. I find that countries experiencing below average rainfall in a given year are more likely to use force over a river claim. I also find that this effect is stronger for states that have arid climates. In addition, the probability of conflict decreases the longer a state remains in a period of drought, suggesting that states adapt to new levels of water availability over time.
Estimating a Split-Population Cox Model using Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression
Standard duration models assume that all individuals in the sample will eventually fail, regardless of whether they are censored. This is often an unjustified assumption that can produce biased coefficient estimates. Split-population models correct this problem by estimating the probability that a unit fails at all, then estimating the hazard rate conditional on the probability of failure. Although parametric split-population models have seen limited applications in political science, I demonstrate that a split-population Cox model can be estimated using a zero-inflated Poisson model based on a convenient equivalence between Cox and Poisson regression. I illustrate the usefulness of the model using a replication analysis of data on international cease-fires.
POLMETH Poster
Lost but not Forgotten: Loss Aversion, Diversionary Conflict, and the Militarization of Territorial Disputes
Diversionary theory posits that international leaders are more likely to engage in the use of military force against other states in times when their tenure in office is imperiled. Recent research on the diversionary use of force has coalesced around the notion that leaders are more likely to divert over certain issues than others. Those issues that are highly salient to the public, such as territory or human rights, are more likely to elicit a positive boost in public opinion for leaders whose status is threatened. Drawing on research on loss aversion, I argue that domestic audiences are more likely to respond favorably to disputes to recover losses of some valuable good rather than promote gains. I test this argument in the context of international territorial disputes using two different indicators of economic performance and find that leaders are far more likely to engage in diversionary military activities against states which have seized land from them than those that have not.
Fight or Flight: Inter-Rival Bargaining, Attrition, and Militarized Threats (with Douglas B. Atkinson and Joshua Jackson)
What explains variations in the level of hostility between rivals? Although most international conflicts occur within the context of rivalry, the level of hostility and conflict within a rivalry varies considerably over time. We explore this issue as it relates to the issuance of militarized threats. We conceptualize rivalry as a game of attrition, wherein rivals compete to obtain a good by imposing costs on each other in a bidding process resembling an auction. Competing rivals attempt to impose costs on each other to force the other state to back down, allowing the winning state to obtain the good at a cheaper cost than they would otherwise. This process continues until the cost of continuing the rivalry for one state exceeds the cost of capitulating and it gives in. As part of this process, rivals attempt to signal their resolve by sending costly signals of their willingness and ability to endure the costs of continuing the dispute. Militarized threats represent one potential signaling mechanism allowing states to issue threats while bearing costs (i.e. the risk of war). Based on this argument, we expect the frequency of militarized threats to be highest during periods of uncertainty about each rival’s resolve, e.g. when the rivalry is new or when there are rapid changes in the distribution of relative power between rivals. We test our argument using the Militarized Compellent Threat dataset.
